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ARTICLES !
The First Amendment Standard for




This article examines the first amendment standards governing
the removal of books from public school curricula that are based
upon or that affect religion. Courts that have recently confronted
this question have applied first amendment standards that ignore
fundamental first amendment establishment clause requirements.
Generally, the first amendment religion clauses prohibit legisla-
tors from enacting any law "respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' The Supreme Court has
interpreted this prohibition to require that
[g]overnment in our democracy, state and national, .. be neu-
tral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may
not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion;
and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious
theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The
First Amendment mandates .governmental neutrality between
Attorney, Department of Justice, Division of the Environment and Natural Resources.
B.A. University of Pennsylvania, 1981; J.D. Yale Law School, 1986. This article was written
by the author in her private capacity; its analyses and opinions are her own. The author wishes
to express appreciation to Louis Kaplan and Elliot Mincberg for their assistance and insights
in preparing this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.2
Addressing religion in public schools, Epperson v. Arkansas
held that the first amendment prohibits governments from "re-
quir[ing] that teaching and learning. . . be tailored to the principles
or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." 8 More recently, the
Supreme Court stated that the establishment clause prohibits public
schools from promoting religious beliefs through the schools' curricu-
lum.4 Consequently, book removals based upon or affecting religious
concerns must comply with these standards.'
The first amendment also prohibits government from "abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press." 6 Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier7 addressed this prohibition in a challenge to a high
school principal's unilateral removal of two pages from a student
newspaper. The principal believed that two articles on those pages
were not suitable for publication and subsequently told the newspa-
per adviser to delete the pages on which the offending stories ap-
peared.8 The Supreme Court held that when educators exercise edi-
torial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities,9 they do not violate the first amend-
ment so long as their actions are reasonably related to "legitimate
pedagogical concerns."' 10
Courts have subsequently applied the Hazelwood standard to
the removal of educational material from school curricula" even for
religious reasons.' 2 Although these recent cases acknowledge the first
amendment application to book removal decisions, they do not ade-
quately consider establishment clause restrictions. The cases also do
not resolve the discrepancy between the stringent restrictions in the
first amendment's establishment clause and the more permissive Ha-
zelwood standard, which standard does not account for the establish-
2. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
3. Id. at 106. The Epperson court further explained that the first amendment prohibi-
tion applies to programs "which 'aid or oppose' any religion," and is an absolute prohibition.
Id.
4. Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3099 n.140 (1989).
5. See infra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
7. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
8. Id. at 263-64.
9. The Court indicated that school-sponsored expressive activities included publications
and theatrical productions and other similar vehicles of student expression. Id. at 273.
10. Id.
11. Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
12. Farrell v. Hall, No. MCA 87-50059-WS, slip op. (N.D. Fla., July 18, 1988); Mc-
Carthy v. Fletcher, 207 Cal. App. 3d 130, 254 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1989).
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ment clause problems raised by book removals.
I' Background
The Supreme Court has held that government action which ad-
vances religion in public schools violates the establishment clause."3
The Court has defined which public school domains religious prefer-
ences may and may not enter. For example, a public school may not
allow religious instruction to be carried out on the school premises.
1
4
Public schools may not allow school-sponsored prayer 15 or daily
readings from the Bible.' 6 Further, public schools may not "require
that teaching and learning . . . be tailored to the principles or
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma."' 7 More recently, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has found that public schools may permit
student religious groups to meet on school premises.'
Even though the Supreme Court has proscribed promotion of
religion in public school programs, people have still tried to find per-
missible ways for public schools to promote religion. For example,
some religious groups have concentrated efforts on electing school
board members who will choose school curricula that will conform
with the religious group's values.' 9 These efforts have included chal-
lenges to the curriculum on such grounds as that the curriculum pro-
13. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) ("the Court has been required
often to invalidate statutes which advance religion in public elementary and secondary
schools").
14. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209 (1948) (public school practices
impermissibly allowed "the operation of the State's compulsory education system [to] assist
and [be] integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious
sects," and "utiliz[ed] the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid reli-
gious groups to spread their faith").
15. Wallace v, Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424
(1962).
16. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
17. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968); see also, Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593
(challenged legislation impermissibly "sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect en-
dorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution").
18. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-73 (1990).
19. In a recent publication, the author suggested that the
[e]lection of a school board may be the best way for fundamentalist groups to
effect lasting changes in the curricula of their local schools. If the board works
within its constitutional limits, which are concededly very broad, the program
and materials implemented by public schools are open to modification. This may
result in public schools that reflect and inculcate the kind of values that many
parents find deplorably lacking in today's public schools.
Note, 'Public Education in Shreds'.- Religious Challenges to Curricular Decisions, 64 IND.
L.J. 11I, 152 (1988) (emphasis added). The author cited Hazelwood "because it may be read
to identify the scope of protection to which board decisions are entitled." Id. at 148. See also
PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, ATrACKS ON THE FREEDOM TO LEARN (1989) (describing
numerous examples of efforts to have school curricula conform to religious preferences).
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moted the "religion" of secular humanism, 20 or that children's expo-
sure to curriculum material burdened parents' free exercise of
religion.2" Parents have also challenged curricula based on the inclu-
sion of religious elements,22 and courts have invalidated public school
authorities' decisions to remove educational material when the re-
moval reflected religious concerns.
23
The discretion granted to schools in selecting curricula material
and the public schools' sanctioned role in promoting values render
curricula decisions extremely vulnerable to the influence of religious
concerns.2 In addition, community members have become more so-
phisticated in navigating through the legal restraints on their right to
inject religiously based concerns into public schools and have learned
to insulate their actions from judicial suspicion. Yet courts tradition-
ally have afforded local school boards' curricula decisions substantial
deference, 25  based upon the principle that schools may inculcate
community values.26 As one commentator has suggested:
20. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) (reversing dis-
trict court's holding that curriculum promoted secular humanism).
21. Mozert v. Board of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that requirement
that students read assigned materials imposed no burden on free exercise); Grove v. Mead
School Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir. 1985) (court found no free exercise violation in
school board's refusal to remove a book that was offensive to plaintiffs' religion).
22. Hall v. Board of School Comm'rs, 656 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that Bible
as Literature course had impermissible effect of advancing religion); cf. Roberts v. Madigan,
702 F. Supp. 1505, 1513 (D. Colo. 1989) (holding that inclusion in classroom library of books
"written to provide children with a better religious understanding of the Christian interpreta-
tion of the Bible" violated establishment clause).
23. Pratt v. Indiana School Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 774-75 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that
film was unconstitutionally removed from course based on "its alleged adverse impact upon the
students' family, religious, and moral values"); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp.
1269, 1271 (D.N.H. 1979) (finding board member's efforts to ban magazine were impermissi-
bly based on his "strong religious -and patriotic views as to ... reading material" appropriate
for high school students); cf. Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 215 (3d Cir. 1981) (parent
complained to board member that school play mocked religion; court found its subsequent
cancellation to be based on it's inappropriate sexual content); Florey v. Sioux Falls School
Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980) (alleging school policy and
rules permitting observance of holidays violated the establishment clause).
24. See supra note 19, infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
25. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863 (1982) (citations omitted) ("local school
boards have broad discretion in the management of school affairs . . . . '[P]ublic education
. . .. is committed to the control of state and local authorities', and . . . federal courts should
not ordinarily 'intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of the
school systems' ").
26. Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (Court agreed "that local school boards must be permitted 'to
establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values' "). Ac-
cording to one commentator, the school board's right to inculcate community values derives
from the representative nature of the school board: "the policies of democratically elected
school boards, and of officials (such as principals) who are directly responsible to them, should
be assumed to be responsive to the wishes of the majority of voters (among which parents are a
sizeable constituency) within the district." Stewart, The First Amendment, the Public
Schools, and the Inculcation of Community Values, 18 J. L. & EDUC. 23, 27 (1989). When
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A school board, however, even if identifiable by religious affilia-
tion, may be able to make substantive changes in the curriculum
which reflect its own values if the changes are made cautiously
and with the constraints of the establishment clause, and the
concomitant potential for challenge on constitutional grounds,
firmly in mind .
7
Another academician has likewise observed that:
The comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials
... to prescribe and control conduct in the schools is thus
double-edged - insulating the state from parental interference
at the judicial level, yet according influential groups the power
to shape education along religious lines at the school board
level without judicial scrutiny.28
Given that school boards may insulate the promotion of reli-
gious interests from constitutional review, courts must shield school
systems from any such impermissible conspiracy.2' The Supreme
Court has recognized that courts must provide vigilent protection
against school boards' attempts to insulate their actions from consti-
tutional review. As Justice Frankfurter stated:
The preservation of the community from divisive conflicts, of
Government from irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, of
religion from censorship and coercion however subtly exercised,
requires strict confinement of the State to instruction other than
religious, leaving to the individual's church and home, indoctri-
this right is exercised to promote the religion of the majority, however, establishment clause
concerns are directly implicated. See infra note 133.
27. Note, supra note 19, at 150. The author, for guidance, referred the reader to a
discussion of the establishment clause requirements. Id. at 150 n.238. The author instructs
that "lain adequate secular purpose can be found in virtually any textbook selection process
which bases its decision on skill development, topic covered, or method of presentation, regard-
less of any moral or value-oriented message that the materials may be alleged to contain." Id.
at 128. The author also suggested how the school board can shield its religiously motivated
actions from constitutional invalidation "by keeping the 'paper trail' following its policy deci-
sions free of comments that could lead to the conclusion that its decisions were based on ille-
gitimate purposes." Id. at 150. The legitimacy of government action under the establishment
clause depends in part on the actor's motivation. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
28. Note, Developments in the Law: Religion and the State, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1606,
1668 (1987) (emphasis added).
29. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) (Supreme Court is "particu-
larly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and sec-
ondary schools"); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) ("it is this Court's inescapable duty to declare whether exer-
cises in the public schools of the States ... are involvements of religion in public institutions
of a kind which offends the First and Fourteenth Amendments"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("[T]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools.").
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nation in the faith of his choice. 0
Likewise, because "[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our
democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common
destiny," strict application of the establishment clause serves the na-
tion's interest in educating children for citizenship in a democratic
society.3' The values promoted by public schools that serve the na-
tion's common destiny are to "include tolerance of divergent political
and religious views, even when the views expressed may be
unpopular."3
The strict application of the establishment clause to public
schools also protects parental interest in controlling childrens' reli-
gious development.
Families entrust public schools with the education of their chil-
dren, but condition their trust on the understanding that the
classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views
that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his
or her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable
and their attendance is involuntary. s
Children also have an interest in having "secular education . . iso-
lated from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all
needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neu-
30. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1948); see also West Virginia
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, 641 (1943) ("purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts ... ;" "Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provoca-
tion than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public educa-
tional officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing").
31. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584; see also Abington, 374 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preserva-
tion of a democratic system of government."); cf. Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979)
(discussing importance of public schools in preparing individuals for participation as citizens,
and in preserving the values on which our society rests).
32. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); see also Board of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879-80 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("school officials may not re-
move books for the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives
discussed in them, when that action is motivated simply by the officials' disapproval of the
ideas involved . . . . At a minimum, allowing a school board to engage in such conduct hardly
teaches children to respect the diversity of ideas that is fundamental to the American sys-
tem"); cf Ambach, 441 U.S. at 75 (public schools are to be "an 'assimilative force' by which
diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought together on a broad but common
ground"); Note, supra note 18, at 1671 ("teaching students to be tolerant of diversity . . . is
consistent with protection of religious choice, even though in substance it may offend some
religious views").
33. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584. See also Steele v. Van Buren Public School Dist., 845
F.2d 1492, 1495 (8th Cir. 1988) (parents have interest in "children being educated in public
schools that do not impose or permit religious practices").
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trality as to religion. '84 Finally, prohibiting schoolboards from tailor-
ing curricula to their constituents' religious demands reflects a prac-
tical need:
Authorities list 256 separate and substantial religious bodies to
exist in the . . .United States . . . .If we are-to eliminate eve-
rything that is objectionable to any of [these religious bodies] or
inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public edu-
cation in shreds. Nothing but educational confusion and a dis-
crediting of the public school system can result ...."
III. Proper First Amendment Standard Applicable to Book Remov-
als that Are Based Upon or Affect Religion
The Supreme Court has stated that "the central liberty which
unifies the various Clauses in the First Amendment" is the "individ-
ual's freedom of conscience." 6 The first amendment was adopted to
curtail Congress's power to interfere with the individual freedom to
believe, to worship, and to express oneself in accordance with the
dictates of one's own conscience. The Court has developed different
standards, corresponding to each of the clauses, which protect
against the different ways that governmental action can infringe
upon this central liberty. 8
34. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 695 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218 (1963)).
35. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring);
see also Flory v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 619 F.2d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 987 (1980).
Courts have also held that if schools were to seek to conform their curricula to free exer-
cise of religion claims of students or parents, this would violate the establishment clause. See
Mozert v. Board of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Efforts to achieve the par-
ticular 'balance' desired by any individual or group by the addition or deletion of religious
material would lead to a forbidden entanglement of the public schools in religious matters, if
done with the purpose or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion."); Hopkins v.
Hamden Bd. of Educ., 289 A.2d 914 (Conn. 1971) (Court said that if school were to alter
curriculum materials based on plaintiffs' objection that curriculum materials conflicted with
plaintiffs' sincere conscientious religious beliefs, school would be directly involving itself in the
teaching and establishment of a religious doctrine); cf. Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 874
F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1989) ("district's exclusion of religious groups from its cocurricular
program is not only reasonable, but also constitutionally required . . . . [D]istrict must ex-
clude organized religious speech because use of public school facilities for religious purposes
violates the establishment clause").
36. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985).
37. Id. at 49; cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (state may not invade
"the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment ... to
reserve from all official control"). The first amendment is made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309
(1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
38. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at
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The establishment clause protects liberty of conscience by defin-
ing the permissible parameters of the relationship between religion
and the state." Justice O'Connor observed that:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from mak-
ing adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community. Government can run afoul
of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive entan-
glement with religious institutions .. . .The second and more
direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of
religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insid-
ers, favored members of the political community. Disapproval
sends the opposite message.
40
The establishment clause standard, then, applies when government
action threatens to endorse or disapprove of religion."
On the other hand, the first amendment's freedom of expression
clause restricts government action that unduly burdens freedom of
speech. Recently, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]f there is a bed-
rock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. 4 2 Unlike the
prohibition against establishment, which is not qualified by any state
interest," the right to freedom of expression is limited by the state
interest in restricting the expression."
223 (purpose of free exercise clause is to secure an individual's religious liberty against any
invasions thereof by civil authority. In a free exercise case, one needs to show "the coercive
effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion."); Engel, 370
U.S. at 430 ("Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion"). See also infra notes 42-48 and accompany-
ing text (discussing interests served and tests for freedom of expression clause).
39. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (discussing establishment clause
as governing church and state relationship).
40. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (citation omitted).
41. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (establishment clause "prohib-
its, at the very least, legislation that constitutes an endorsement of one or another set of reli-
gious beliefs or of religion generally").
42. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989).
43. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (describing prohibition against es-
tablishment of religion as "absolute"); see also infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
44. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542 (court examines "whether the States' interest
in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justifies [defendant's]
conviction"); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269-70 (1988) (balancing
students' freedom of expression in school-sponsored activities against educators' interest in con-
trolling the curriculum); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943)
(stating that the challenge presented a conflict between state authority and rights of the
individual).
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A. The Hazelwood Freedom of Expression Standard
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,'5 the Supreme
Court determined that the educators' interest in defining curricula
was greater than students' interest in school-sponsored freedom of
expression. The Court framed the issue as "whether the First
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote a particular
speech."'4 6  This question "concern[ed] educators' authority over
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other ex-
pressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school."
4 7
Significantly, the court did not confront allegations that the chal-
lenged state action was based upon or affected religion.
The Court held that educators do not violate the first amend-
ment when they exercise "editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns."' 8 Thus, the Court held that the basis for the removal - the
principal's conclusion that two articles49 were not suitable for publi-
cation - was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,
and that therefore, the principal's actions did not violate the first
amendment. 50
Courts often quote Barnette to express the restrictions placed by the freedom of expres-
sion clause on government action. Barnette stated that "no official . . . can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, or religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." 319 U.S. at 642. In Barnette the plain-
tiffs challenged a regulation that required students to salute the flag and say the Pledge of
Allegiance as constituting an unconstitutional denial of religious freedom and freedom of
speech. Id. at 630. The Court, assessing the reach of State power, stated: "[Clensorship or
suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression
presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and
punish." Id. at 634. The Court appears to have modified this standard for challenges occurring
within the public schools. See infra notes 46-54; see also Underwood, Establishment of Reli-
gion in Primary and Secondary Schools, 55 EDUc. L. REP. 807, 817 (1989) ("In the area of
rights of free expression the Court has modified the concept of general governmental limitation
on speech - curtailing speech that constitutes a clear and present danger - to allow the
curtailing of speech when the expression presents a material and substantial disruption to the
school.").
45. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
46. Id. at 270-71.
47. Id. at 271.
48. Id. at 271-72. The Court characterized these activities "as part of the school curric-
ulum" in contrast to student "personal expression which happens to occur on the school prem-
ises," which, the Court implied, would not be subject to the same standard. Id. at 271,
49. One article described three Hazelwood East students' experiences with pregnancy;
the other related the impact of divorce on students at the school. Id. at 263.
50. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). The Court also
stated that "only when the decision to censor a ... vehicle of student expression has no valid
educational purpose [is] the First Amendment . . . so 'directly and sharply implicate[d],' ...
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Hazelwood determined that students' freedom of expression
rights should be more limited within the public schools"1 in order to
maintain consistency between student expression on the one hand,
and the educators' lessons, the students' level of maturity, and civi-
lized values on the other.5' Hazelwood permitted school authorities
to moniter student speech that could be attributed to the school it-
self, rather than to the individual speakers.53 As a result, the school
board, not the court, retained the power to determine when student
speech was inconsistent with a school's educational mission.",
B. The Establishment Clause Standard
The Supreme Court has developed a three-pronged test to deter-
mine whether state action comports with the establishment clause. 55
The test, first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman," requires that
[flirst, the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular
purpose. Second, the statute's principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the
statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of govern-
as to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights." Id. (citations
omitted).
51. Id. at 266 (students' rights to freedom of speech " 'are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings,' . . . A school need not tolerate student speech that
is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission,' even though the government could not cen-
sor similar speech outside the school") (citations omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id. Hazelwood effectively held that schools need not adapt their educational mis-
sions to accommodate students' freedom of expression. This decision may be compared to free-
dom of religion cases, in which the Court has ruled that the government need not alter its
programs to alleviate burdens that the programs impose on claimants' free exercise of religion.
The Court in recent years has made clear that while "[tihe Free Exercise Clause affords an
individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion[,] it does not afford an
individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedure." Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986); cf. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988) ("Whatever may be the exact line on the free exercise of religion and
the legitimate conduct of government of its own affairs, the location of the line cannot depend
on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development.").
54. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988). Similarly, stu-
dents' rights to the free exercise of religion in the public schools are limited by the schools'
educational mission. See Mozert v. Board of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1071 (6th Cir. 1987)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Accommodating appellees' beliefs would unduly interfere with the
fulfillment" of the school's educational interests); Grove v. Mead School Dist., 753 F.2d 1528,
1533 (9th Cir. 1985) ("state interest in providing well-rounded public education would be
critically impeded by accommodation" of plaintiff's religious sensibilities by removing book
from the curriculum).
55. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
55-56 (1985). For an extensive list of Supreme Court cases that have applied this test, see
Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100 n.44 (1989).
56. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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ment with religion.5 7
All three requirements must be satisfied to pass the establishment
clause test.56
Although the Court has on rare occassions chosen an alternative
establishment clause test,59 it has applied the Lemon test in most
cases involving a challenge to government action in the primary and
secondary school context.60 In addition, the Court has recently modi-
fied the Lemon test, making the establishment clause standard even
more stringent in public school cases." The Court has particularly
focused on whether the challenged governmental practice either has
the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion." Justice O'Connor ex-
plained the rationale for the focus on endorsement:
We live in a pluralistic society. Our citizens come from diverse
religious traditions or adhere to no particular religious beliefs at
all. If government is to be neutral in matters of religion, rather
than showing either favoritism or disapproval towards citizens
based on their personal religious choices, government cannot en-
dorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without
sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders
57. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583 (citations omitted).
58. Id. Book removals primarily implicate concerns addressed by the first and second
Lemon requirements regarding impermissible motives and effects of state action. This article
focuses on these two requirements, and not on the nonentanglement requirement. The
nonentanglement requirement addresses the ongoing interaction between church and state,
which book removals are not likely to involve. The permissibility of.aid-to-parochial school
cases has often turned on the nonentanglement requirement. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 411 (1985); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 768 (1973). In such cases, the nonentanglement test focuses on the nature of the interac-
tion between church and state in administering that aid. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 408. If the
interaction, such as supervision or monitoring required by the aid, would unduly intrude upon
the sectarian institution, the nonentanglement requirement is violated. Id. at 409-12. See also
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370 (1974).
59. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The Court, in holding that the
Nebraska Legislature's practice of beginning each of its seasons with a prayer by a chaplain
paid by the state did not violate the establishment clause, relied on historical evidence to sup-
port the theory that the drafters of the first amendment intended that, under the establishment
clause, the chaplaincy practice authorized by the First Congress was permissible. Id. at 783-
92.
60. The Court has stated that it has "particularly relied on Lemon in every case involv-
ing the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the education of our chil-
dren." School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985); cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
583 n.4 (1987) (Lemon has been applied in all cases since its adoption, except for Marsh;
historical approach used in Marsh "is not useful in determining the proper roles of church and
state in public schools, since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the
Constitution was adopted").
61. See infra note 64-65 and accompanying text.
62. See infra note 64. See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. I, 9 n.1
(1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 473 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
95 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1991
or less than full members of the political community. 68
The Court has applied the endorsement standard in recent es-
tablishment clause cases involving public schools. 4 Because under
this standard creating a perception of endorsement of religion is im-
permissible, and in the public school context the perception is that of
children of impressionable years, it is more likely that courts will
find a violation of the establishment clause.68 Commentators find the
endorsement test particularly appropriate for establishment clause
analysis in the public schools.
Because the school's role is to educate students and inculcate
values, when the school even slightly favors a religion, or any
religion, a greater danger of establishment of religion exists. The
concept of prohibiting a message of endorsement fits well within
the public school and the relationship between school and stu-
dent; the standard for establishment of religion should be
heightened for the K-12 setting. Because of the impressionabil-
ity of the students involved, considering age and maturity, and
because the purpose of the school is to educate and inculcate
values, it is dangerous when a student perceives that the school
is promoting or hindering religion.66
In the endorsement context, Lemon's secular purpose test il-
luminates "whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or dis-
approve of religion."' 6 7 Thus, a secular purpose would not be suffi-
cient to justify an act under Lemon's first prong. Rather, under the
endorsement focus,
the inquiry shifts from whether a secular purpose exists to
whether government has given its stamp of approval to a partic-
ular religious practice or belief. The endorsement test allows
government to consider religion in making the law. But if in en-
acting a statute the state intends to send a message of endorse-
ment of religion, the statute is unconstitutional, regardless of
whether it has a secular purpose.68
The endorsement standard requires "that the legislature manifest a
63. Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3119 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. See Underwood, supra note 44, at 810 (listing cases applying endorsement test, in-
cluding Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585; Ball, 473 U.S. at 389; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56). The
endorsement modification has also been applied by the court outside of this context. See Alle-
gheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3090.
65. Underwood, supra note 44, at 812.
66. Id. at 818.
67. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56
(1985).
68. Underwood, supra note 44, at 811.
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secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements from its law." 69
A public school violates this requirement when its curriculum is "tai-
lored . . . to satisfy the principles or prohibitions of any religion,
' '7 0
or when a school board "structure[s] its text designation to promote
a particular religious viewpoint. ' 7 1 Thus, book removals that evi-
dence a purpose of endorsing sectarian beliefs will violate the first
prong of the Lemon test.
Under the endorsement focus, the second prong of the Lemon
test examines whether a statute conveys a message of endorsement.72
Thus, in a book removal case, the focus is whether the public per-
ceives the removal decision as favoring or disfavoring religion. To the
extent the public perceives a removal as endorsing a sectarian con-
cern, and the perception is that, but for endorsing the sectarian in-
terest the act would not have been taken, the removal is
impermissible.
When courts have confronted cases involving establishment and
free exercise of speech concerns in the public schools, they have
found that establishment clause concerns take precedence over other
first amendment interests.7 8 Although courts may properly evaluate
book removals that do not implicate religious concerns under free-
dom of expression jurisprudence, 4 courts must find removals that
69. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
70. Mozert v. Board of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1064 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
71. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979).
72. Underwood, supra note 44, at 813.
73. See Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1512 (D. Colo. 1989) (in public school
context, when teacher asserts free speech and freedom of expression rights, court asserts that
"[b]oth the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect the freedom to express religious
views, yet both are subject to the strictures of the Establishment Clause"); Clark v. Dallas
Indep. School Dist., 671 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (N.D. Tex. 1987) ("In weighing the appro-
priate interests at issue in the [public secondary school] environment, that is, the district's
interest in meeting its constitutional obligation of neutrality and the students' interest in the
free exercise of their religious expression, the scales are tipped in favor the district . . . .The
constitutional interests present in this circumstance require that the establishment clause inter-
ests of the district take precedence over the free exercise interests of Plaintiffs."); Perumal v.
Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 71-72, 198 Cal. App. 3d 859C,
243 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549-51 (1988) ("Cases involving students' religious rights must be re-
viewed in the context of their First Amendment rights and the district's mandate to avoid
violating the establishment clause of the First Amendment . . . .Under the free exercise
clause, freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organizations or beliefs
as the individual may choose is secured against governmental interference . . . .The inevita-
ble consequence of the establishment clause when applied to religious ritual on school property
is to restrict that activity to preserve the wall between church and state . . . . [S]tudents' free
speech and associational rights . . . are severely circumscribed by the Establishment Clause in
the public school setting."); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1980)
(while students have First Amendment rights to political speech in public schools, "sensitive
Establishment Clause considerations limit their right to air religious doctrines").
74. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (right to receive information and
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implicate religious concerns to be consistent with establishment
clause mandates and freedom of expression standards.
C. Distinctions Between Hazelwood and Establishment Clause
Standards
The Hazelwood standard, which finds acceptable educators' ac-
tions that restrict students' freedom of expression, provides more lat-
itude to educators than does the Lemon standard. In some cases, ac-
tion meeting the Hazelwood "legitimate pedagogical concern"
requirement will also meet Lemon's requirement that the govern-
ment's purpose is not endorsement of religion. Even so, the Hazel-
wood standard has a more limited inquiry than the Lemon test.
First, Lemon proscribes government action whose purpose is en-
dorsement of religion. Whether an act can be objectively perceived
as addressing a legitimate pedagogical concern is different from
whether it was in fact adopted to address that concern. A court
could find that a book removal advances a legitimate pedagogical
concern when, in fact, the motivation for the action was not to ad-
dress that concern, but to endorse religion.
Second, Lemon's inquiry into purpose clearly requires the court
to distinguish an actual secular purpose from a stated, pretextual
purpose, 75 whereas the Hazelwood standard does not. Hazelwood
provides that judicial "intervention to protect students' constitutional
rights" is necessary only when the censorship decision "has no valid
educational purpose. ' 76 A pretextual educational purpose could be
deemed "invalid." But the emphasis on avoiding judicial "interven-
tion," heightened by a preceding sentence stating that "the educa-
tion of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents,
teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal
judges,"" suggests that courts should defer to educators' statements
of an educational purpose.
Third, the endorsement modification proscribes government acts
that, although advancing a secular purpose, reflect an intent to con-
vey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion. The Hazel-
wood standard does not require consideration of the message con-
veyed by a book removal.
Thus, because Hazelwood does not require that the asserted
ideas is "an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution").
75. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-87 (1987).
76. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
77. Id.
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educational purpose be the actual purpose of the challenged action,
and does not explicitly require the court either to distinguish a sham
from an actual purpose or to examine the actor's intent to convey a
message in making the removal, the standard does not afford the
same degree of constitutional protection as does the first part of the
Lemon test.78 Further, the Hazelwood standard completely fails to
address the requirement that governmental action must not endorse
or disapprove of religion, as contemplated by the second part of the
Lemon test. 9 Therefore, while the public school context demands the
most heightened establishment clause scrutiny, Hazelwood permits a
more unfettered intrusion on freedom of expression rights.80
IV. Courts' Application of the Hazelwood Standard to Book Re-
moval Cases Erroneously Allows Free Speech Jurisprudence to Pre-
empt Establishment Clause Standards
The following discussion of three book removal cases demon-
strates that book removal decisions may in fact endorse religion, and
that the courts' first amendment analyses fail to address this problem
adequately. The courts' treatment of first amendment concerns al-
lows the control over student-sponsored speech for educational pur-
poses granted to local school authorities by Hazelwood to preempt
establishment clause standards. 81 As discussed above, this directly
contradicts the principle that, in the public school context, establish-
ment clause concerns must take precedence over free speech
concerns.
8 2
In Virgil v. School Board,8" plaintiffs challenged the removal of
a textbook from an elective high school humanities class. 4 The par-
ties stipulated that the removal decision was based on a number of
factors that included "'the sexuality' " and the "'excessively vulgar
78. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 29-35, 51-54 and accompanying text.
81. Each court applied the Hazelwood standard to a book removal decision that was
challenged as being based upon or affecting religion. Each court recognized that the first
amendment places some restraints on the removal actions. Two discussed the potential applica-
bility of the establishment clause. Ultimately, however, the courts' first amendment inquiries
all focused on the school boards' motivations in removing the books. This focus of the courts'
inquiry, as well as the courts' analyses of permissible motivations, does not comport with estab-
lishment clause mandates.
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83. 677 F. Supp. 1547, 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 862 F.2d 1517, 1519 (11th Cir.
1989).
84. The removal was based on two selections in the book, the English translations of
Lysistrata, by Aristophanes, and The Miller's Tale, by Geoffrey Chaucer, neither of the which
had been assigned to the classes. 862 F.2d at 1519.
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. . . language and subject matter'" in the selections.85 The plaintiffs
contended that the Board members removed the material in order to
impose their fundamentalist Christian beliefs on the students.86 The
district court agreed that the removal decision reflected the Board's
views of the appropriate values to which students should be exposed,
but found that such actions were permissible under the Hazelwood
standard.87 The court reasoned that since Hazelwood held that deny-
ing students access to "potentially sensitive topics" such as sexuality
was a legitimate pedagogical end, the Board's removal was
permissible.88
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment.89 Like the district
court, the court of appeals considered the applicability of the estab-
lishment clause to book removals. The court reasoned in part that
since the Board stipulated as to its motivation, which did not include
any reference to religion, it did not have to consider a line of deci-
sions that placed strict limits on a school board's discretion to use
the curriculum to advance religious views in violation of the estab-
lishment clause.90 The court supported its position with cases apply-
ing the Lemon test.91
However, because the motivation for removal was stipulated as
being related to the explicit sexuality and excessively vulgar lan-
guage in the selections, the court concluded that the school board's
stated reasons for the removal decision were sufficient to establish
the school board's motivation and that the Hazelwood standard
would control. 92 Applying Hazelwood, the court found that the stip-
ulated motives related to legitimate concerns.9
The court's conclusion that the stipulated motivations precluded
the need for further establishment clause inquiry raises a number of
problems. First, the court did not consider whether the Board's con-
cern with the eight stipulated secular factors could have been moti-
85. Virgil, 677 F. Supp. at 1552.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Virgil v. School Bd., 677 F. Supp. 1547, 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 862 F.2d
1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
89. Virgil, 862 F.2d at 1525.
90. Id. at 1521 n.3.
91. The court cited Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) and Smith v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 693-94 (11 th Cir. 1987), both of which apply the Lemon test,
as well as Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), an establishment clause case decided
prior to the development of the Lemon test.
92. Virgil, 862 F.2d at 1523. The court also noted that "[p]laintiffs have not argued on
appeal that any genuine issues of fact remain" regarding the Board's motives. Id. at 1522 n.6.
93. Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989).
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vated by an actual purpose to endorse or disapprove of religion.94
The stipulation did not preclude the possibility that religious con-
cerns motivated the Board's concern with the factors. The court even
acknowledged this possibility in a footnote:
The comments of protesting parents and Superintendent Pitt-
man might have suggested other possible motivations for the
Board action . . . .Superintendent Pittman commented: "that
any literature in which God's name is used in vain is not appro-
priate for use in the classroom."05
Whether the court of appeals heard the argument that religious con-
cerns motivated the removal was not clear.96 Had the court heard
this argument, it should have determined whether a desire to impose
fundamentalist Christian beliefs on the students motivated the
board's concern with the eight "secular" factors.
Virgil raises the question of how a court should respond when a
plaintiff alleges that both religious and secular motives underlie a
school board's action. In such an instance, the court must assess
whether, despite the motives' secular aspect, the board also intended
to send a message of endorsement of religious beliefs that were con-
sistent with the identified secular factors. Thus, when a removal de-
cision advances values that are both religious and secular, the court
must ascertain whether the removal was motivated by an intent to
endorse the religious, rather than secular, roots.
97
Second, the Virgil analysis represents a complete failure to con-
sider the second Lemon requirement. Allegations and evidence
before the court implied that religion played a role in the book re-
moval. Even if the Board member's actual purpose was not to impose
their "fundamentalist Christian beliefs" on the students, the commu-
nity members' perception of it as such implicates the establishment
clause mandate that government action not communicate a message
of endorsement of religious concerns. The court's failure to consider
whether the effect of the removal was to convey endorsement of
Christian fundamentalist precepts, and disapproval of other precepts,
consequently leaves the public school community unprotected against
establishment clause infringements.
94. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
95. Virgil, 862 F.2d at 1522 n.6.
96. The district court heard this argument, however. Virgil v. School Bd., 677 F. Supp.
1547, 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
97. See also infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text (discussing problem of mixed
motives).
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In McCarthy v. Fletcher," plaintiffs launched a first amend-
ment challenge to a school district's removal of two books, Grendel
and One Hundred Year's of Solitude, from the high school's curricu-
lum. A student's complaint based on religious grounds prompted the
initial review of Grendel." The superintendent's and vice-principal's
review of Grendel clearly revealed that they had reservations about
the book because of its religiously offensive messages.100 Despite the
fact that Superintendent Fletcher and Vice-Principal Johnson ex-
pressed several legitimate educational concerns about the books' suit-
ability for classroom teaching, 101 religious concerns clearly influ-
enced their removal decision.
Reversing the grant of summary judgment for the school board,
the appellate court remanded the case with instructions regarding
the constitutional standard to be applied in determining a school
board's right to exclude books from a curriculum. 02 The court's in-
structions first referenced the holding in Board of Education v.
Pico. ' Pico posited that "school boards could not remove books
from school libraries simply because they disliked the ideas con-
tained in those books."'0 " The court then discussed establishment
clause restraints on school board authority, observing that
[w]hat is critical ...is that a school board does not have the
power to advance or inhibit a particular religious orthodoxy as a
"community value" no matter how prevalent or unpopular the
orthodox view might be in the community. This is the essence of
the establishment clause of the First Amendment, i.e., govern-
ment neutrality with respect to religion. 05
98. 207 Cal. App. 3d 130, 254 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1989).
99. Id. at 137, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
100. The court explained:
In analyzing Grendel, Superintendent Fletcher stated the "subject of nihilism is
presented with an emphasis on anti-government, anti-God, anti-religion and anti-
personal dignity" and further "[t]his book is designed to break down a student's
belief in God, government and the basic respect for the dignity of people." Vice-
principal Johnson echoed Fletcher's opinion stating that the "book contains
many anti-government, anti-God, and anti-religion statements." Johnson de-
scribed One Hundred Years of Solitude as being "negative ... to the Catholic
religion."
Id. at 137-38, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 717. Nevertheless, the court stated that the school board had
expressed no reasons for excluding the books. Id. at 141, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 135, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
103. McCarthy v. Fletcher, 207 Cal. App. 3d 130, 139, 254 Cal. Rptr. 714, 721 (1989)
(citing Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)).
104. 207 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
105. Id. at 143, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 722 (emphasis added). The court's characterization of
the "essence" of the establishment clause is based on West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943), a freedom of expression case (see supra note 44), and thus does not
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The Court confined its analysis of the establishment clause to a
consideration of Pratt v. Indiana School District,106 which held that
"a cognizable First Amendment claim exists if material is excluded
from the curriculum to suppress an ideological or religious viewpoint
with which the local authorities disagree."' 10 7 After a brief treatment
of Pratt, the Court shifted its focus to the Supreme Court's decision
in Hazelwood and concluded that the Hazelwood standard should
apply to the curriculum decision made by Superintendent Fletcher
and Vice-Principal Johnson because Hazelwood implies that its dis-
cussion of the appropriate first amendment inquiry applies to a wide
variety of educators' curriculum decisions. 1'08
The McCarthy Court, however, failed to reconcile the Hazel-
wood standard with the establishment clause standards applied in
Lemon, Stone v. Graham, and Grove v. Mead School District.09
The prohibition against board action based on "an intent to prescribe
what shall be orthodox in . . .religion" articulated in Pico is not as
encompassing as the Lemon test's first prong, which requires that the
motivation not be to endorse religion. In some cases, a purpose to
endorse religion is not tantamount to an intention to prescribe what
is orthodox in religion, which the Court provided must be "rigid and
exclusive indoctrination." 110
More significantly, the Court's standard completely disregarded
the second Lemon test requirement: the action cannot effectively en-
dorse or disapprove of religion. The Court's observation that school
administrators who tried "to maintain a neutral classroom environ-
ment concerning religious orthodoxy by deleting books that criticize
the religious views of the community" are pursuing "an arguably
legitimate educational purpose""' underscored the Court's inatten-
provide the proper establishment clause standard. In supporting this observation, the Court
cited the origin of the Lemon test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), as well
as Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) and Grove v. Mead School Dist., 753 F.2d
1528, 1534 (9th Cir. 1985), cases which have applied the Lemon test. See generally
McCarthy.
106. 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982).
107. McCarthy, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 145, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 722 (citing Pratt v. Indiana
School Dist., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982)). Pratt was decided on the basis of the freedom of
expression clause, not the establishment clause. Pratt, 670 F.2d at 775-79.
108. McCarthy v. Fletcher, 207 Cal. App. 3d 130, 145-46, 254 Cal. Rptr. 714, 723
(1989).
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
110. McCarthy, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 146, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
Ill. Id. at 142, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 720. The court stated that:
[l]t cannot be said that the books were excluded for legitimate educational rea-
sons. Two rational but conflicting interpretations as to motivation may be drawn
from the opinions that Grendel and One Hundred Years of Solitude were anti-
God, anti-religious and anti-Catholic in light of all of the circumstances in the
95 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1991
tiveness to this requirement. If educators could remove books that
criticize the community's religious views and retain books that are
critical of other religious views, their actions would impermissibly
convey a message to the community that certain majority religious
views are protected from criticism and are preferred, while other mi-
nority religious views are not so insulated and therefore are not pre-
ferred. As Justice O'Connor has observed,
[s]uch an endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the
nonadherent, for "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial sup-
port of government is placed behind a particular religious belief,
the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to con-
form to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."' 1 '
Likewise, the second Lemon test requirement is violated if, despite
legitimate educational goals, the community perceives actions as
favoring the religious views criticized in the removed books.
Plaintiffs in Farrell v. Hall118 also challenged on a first amend-
ment basis the removal of three books. The plaintiffs alleged that
religious concerns motivated the superintendent to remove the
books.1"4
The Supreme Court applied the Hazelwood standard to the first
amendment question without acknowledging that the establishment
clause applied to book removals. In delineating the permissibility of
school board actions, the court stated that "removal of works for
legitimate pedagogical goals, including the inculcation of community
values, will generally not implicate the first amendment."1 ' Relying
record: (1) the administrators were merely trying to maintain a neutral class-
room environment concerning religious orthodoxy by deleting books which criti-
cize the religious views of the community - an arguably legitimate educational
purpose, or (2) the administrators were acting to protect and advance the Chris-
tian ideology on behalf of the Wasco religious community - a patently illegiti-
mate educational purpose.
Id.
112. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
113. No. MCA 87-50059-WS, slip op. (N.D. Fla. 1988).
114. Id. at 10. The complaint alleged that the Superintendent's
actions were motivated by his personal beliefs which form the basis for his con-
servative educational policy. (Superintendent] Hall believes that his duty as su-
perintendent is to restore Christian values to the Bay County school system. He
thinks that one vulgarity in a work of literature is sufficient reason to keep the
book from the Bay County school curricula. Hall's opposition to I am the Cheese
arises solely from his personal opposition to the ideas expressed in the book. He
believes that it is improper to question the trustworthiness of the government.
Thus, students should not be presented with such ideas.
Id.
115. Id. at 31 (citing Bethel v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986); Hazelwood School Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)).
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on Hazelwood, the Court observed that "[t]he Supreme Court has
recently confirmed that local school board officials do not violate the
first amendment by making curriculum decisions with legitimate
pedagogical goals, even if those decisions would not withstand a first
amendment challenge outside the public education context." 6
Farrell, however, incorrectly construed Hazelwood. Hazelwood
can be applied only to freedom of expression and not establishment
clause jurisprudence. Hazelwood does not indicate that a school
board's discretion to remove educational material, even if for legiti-
mate pedagogical goals, insulates such action from establishment
clause scrutiny."17 In fact, establishment clause scrutiny is height-
ened in the public school environment.11 8 When local school officials
act in a manner that implicates religious concerns, this heightened
scrutiny limits their discretion to "establish and implement the cur-
riculum to transmit community values . . . based on the social and
ethical values of the school officials."'" 9 The Farrell court failed to
recognize the distinction between establishment and freedom of ex-
pression jurisprudence.
The first amendment restriction articulated in Farrell precluded
school officials from "ban[ning] works solely because they object to
the religious or political content expressed in the work and wish to
prevent the ideas from being expressed at the school."' 20 In light of
this restriction, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss be-
cause the case presented
the narrow fact pattern on which courts have found the first
amendment implicated by the action of local school officials in
removing works from the curriculum. The defendant has offered
no explanation for his decisions regarding these books, and at
this point, the record contains only the constitutionally imper-
missible reasons alleged in the complaint.'
Under this standard, first amendment violations would arise only if
school board action was based solely on religious concerns. The Far-
rell standard would not prohibit action that, although augmented by
educational goals, was taken to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion to the community and would therefore be im-
permissible under the establishment clause. Nor would this standard
116. Id. at 33.
117. See also Bethel v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (same).
118. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
119. Farrell v. Hall, No. MCA 87-50059-WS, slip op. at 30 (N.D. Fla. 1988).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 34.
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proscribe action that, regardless of motivation, had the effect of con-
veying a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion to the
community.
The Virgil, McCarthy, and Farrell approaches to the first
amendment standard applicable to school board removal decisions
fail to comply with the Lemon mandates. The continuing application
of these approaches to book removal decisions portends the erosion
of establishment clause protection of the public school community.
V. Problems Raised by Application of the Establishment Clause to
Book Removal Decisions
A. How Can Courts Assess Whether An Asserted Secular Purpose
Is Sincere, or Only a Mere Pretext for Endorsing Religion?
The first part of the Lemon test requires that government actors
"manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements
from its law."'22 Although courts are normally deferential to an ar-
ticulation of a secular purpose, courts still require that the statement
of such purpose "be sincere and not a sham." 12 3 In assessing whether
an asserted secular purpose is an actual motive or a sham motive,
courts look to the history, language, and administration of the chal-
lenged action.1
24
One factor that can help courts determine whether an asserted
secular purpose is sincere is whether the challenged action is neces-
sary for and actually accomplishes its asserted secular purpose.'25
Courts also assess whether the pattern of conduct surrounding the
action, including the legislative history,'26 is consistent with the
stated secular purpose127
122. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987).
123. Id.
124. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586 (because Act's requirement that schools teach crea-
tion science and evolution did not advance stated purpose of protecting academic freedom,
court concluded that that purpose was pretext); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59 (since previous law
provided for one-minute period of meditation, Act's stated purpose of providing such a period
was pretext for real purpose of characterizing prayer as favored practice); cf. Pratt v. Indiana
School Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 778-79 (8th Cir. 1982) (since record did not support that removal
of film was needed to accomplish its stated purpose of protecting students from violence, court
concluded that real purpose was to express an "official policy with respect to God and
country").
126. Although there will not be legislative history per se in book removal case, there
may be statements accompanying the removals which similarly explain the state actions.
127. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 57 (statement inserted into legislative record by bill's sponsor
indicates that legislation was "'effort to return voluntary prayer' to the public schools"); Ed-
wards v. Aguillar, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987) (statement by sponsor of challenged Act that he
would prefer "that neither [creation nor evolution] be taught" found to be inconsistent with
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Another focus for determining the truthfulness of a stated pur-
pose is the "historic and contemporaneous link between teachings of
certain religious denominations" and the subject of the challenged
action. 128 These factors can be examined in book removal cases to
determine whether the stated secular purpose is the true purpose, or
whether it is a pretext for the endorsement of religion.
B. If an Act Is Motivated by Concerns That Have Both a Reli-
gious and Secular Basis, When Is There a Purpose to Endorse
Religion?
In some cases, evidence will support both a secular and religious
purpose behind the book removal. In other cases, the values that the
book removal promotes may have both a secular and a religious ba-
sis. This raises a question as to when, in "mixed motive" cases, the
book removal has the impermissible purpose of endorsing religion.
Although the first prong of the Lemon test is violated if a state
action is entirely motivated by a purpose to endorse religion, it does
not require that the action have exclusively secular objectives. 129 The
question pivots on when an action that is based on secular and reli-
gious motives becomes an impermissible endorsement. The Supreme
Court has not offered precise guidance on this question. 30 Courts
should assess whether, but for the religious purpose, the government
would have taken such action. If the determination is negative,' 3' the
stated purpose of promoting academic freedom); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 224 (1963) ("None of these factors is consistent with the contention that the Bible is here
used either as an instrument for nonreligious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teach-
ing of secular subjects"); cf. Pratt, 670 F.2d at 778 (school board's justification for film re-
moval based on alleged violence was not supported by "systematic review of violence in the
curriculum").
128. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589-93 (Court found link between teaching of evolution and
"religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind"
which supported conclusion that "legislation . . . sought to alter the science curriculum to
reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution"); cf.
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) ("Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text
in the Jewish and Christian faiths"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98 (1968) ("statute
was a product of the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor that viewed evolution as con-
tradicting the literal interpretation of the Bible"); Abington, 374 U.S. at 224 ("the Bible as an
instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid").
129. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); id. at 66 (Powell, J., concurring).
130. The Supreme Court has, however, permitted the government to acknowledge or
take religion into account in making law and policy; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70; to take actions
that happen to coincide with the tenets of religion; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442
(1961); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70; and to teach about religion; Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 ("the
Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, com-
parative religion, or the like").
131. In cases raising the mixed motives question, if plaintiff can show that religious
concerns played a role in the removal decision, the defendant should have the burden of show-
ing that the role was not decisive, and that the decision would have been made to remove the
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court should find that the purpose of the removal was to endorse
religion. This approach is based on the inference that if the act
would not have been taken absent a religious purpose, then its pur-
pose would be to endorse religion. Thus, in cases in which the values
allegedly promoted by a book removal could have both secular and
religious bases, the court must determine whether, but for the reli-
gious basis of those values, the book would have been removed.1"'
When the evidence shows that the removal was intended to promote
both religious and secular values, and if the removal would not have
been made absent a desire to promote religious values, then the pur-
pose of the removal is impermissible."3 8
Jager v. Douglas County School District "' applied a similar
approach. The school board in Jager had provided four purposes for
book despite the presence of religious concerns.
132. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Supreme Court applied an
approach that bears some similarity to the one suggested here. In that case, the Court was
confronted with a challenged practice that had both religious and secular motivations - the
Sunday closing laws had their genesis in religion but were found to serve a current secular
need for a uniform day of rest. The Court in effect found that, despite the religious origin of
the laws, there was a current secular purpose for the law which was its contemporary reason
for existence. Thus, but for the religious purpose, the law still may have existed to serve .this
secular purpose. Id. at 442. Likewise, in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), the Court's
decision, while never explicitly stating it, seems premised on the conclusion that, even if there
were some impermissible religious motives behind the legislation, the statute would have been
enacted to serve the secular purposes that the Court found. Id. at 602 ("clear from the fact of
the statute that [it] was motivated primarily, if not entirely, by a legitimate secular pur-
pose-the elimination or reduction of social and economic problems caused by teenage sexual-
ity, pregnancy, and parenthood"). Cf. Flory v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 619 F.2d 1311, 1314-
15 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980) (although the rules permitted the schools to
observe holidays that had both a secular and a religious basis, the rules were adopted to ensure
that no religious exercise was included among officially sanctioned school activities).
133. The import of the "but for" rule is that the first amendment limits the right to
influence the designation of public school curriculum materials based on religious convictions.
This is, however, consistent with the intent of the first amendment. See Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (free exercise clause "has never meant that a majority
could use the machinery of the state to practice its beliefs"); id. at 231 ("While our institu-
tions reflect a firm conviction that we are a religious people, those institutions by solemn con-
stitutional injunction may not officially involve religion in such a way as to prefer, discriminate
against, or oppress, a particular sect or religion"); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and offi-
cials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to...
freedom of worship . . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections"); id. at 641 ("no deeper division of our people could
proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and
whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing"). Thus,
the first amendment intended to prohibit political majorities from legislating their religious
preferences to impose their religiously based values upon the public school curricula. See also
infra note 140. But see Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding outside
curricula context that Lemon test must not be interpreted as "disenfranchising religious groups
when they succeed in influehcing secular decisions").
134. 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989).
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pregame invocations with religious references. 135 Three were secular,
and the fourth was "'to satisfy the genuine, good faith wishes on the
part of a majority of the citizens . . . to publicly express support for
Protestant Christianity.' "186 The court found that, because "[t]he
School District could serve all of its cited secular purposes by requir-
ing wholly secular inspirational speeches" but declined to do so, the
district's primary purpose was not to advance its three secular inter-
ests, but to have invocations that publicly expressed support for Prot-
estant Christianity."' In effect, absent the fourth religious purpose,
the challenged act would not have been taken. The invocations were
thus found to have an impermissible religious purpose.
The "but for" approach suggests an analysis that is different
from the approach applied by the Virgil court. 38 In Virgil, the
plaintiffs alleged that the stipulated secular motives behind the
board's actions derived from their desire to impose their religious
concerns on the public school community. 39 The court did not probe
beyond the "secular" factors of the stipulation to assess whether the
factors were prompted by religious concerns. Thus, the Virgil court
found the book removal to be permissible. Under the "but for" ap-
proach, however, the court would have determined whether the fac-
tors were prompted by religious concerns, and if they were, whether
the board would have removed the reading material absent the reli-
gious concerns. If the reading material would not have been re-
moved, the court would have found that the Board's action imper-
missibly advanced the purpose of endorsing a religious perspective.
C. Courts Should Presume that When Books Are Removed from
the Curricula, the Effect of the Removal Is to Endorse the Concern
That Is Perceived to Have Prompted the Removal.
This section addresses the relation between the message con-
veyed by the removal of a book from public school curricula and the
second prong of the Lemon test, which requires that government ac-
tion not have the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion."' 40
135. Id. at 829.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
139. Virgil v. School Bd., 677 F. Supp. 1547, 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 862 F.2d
1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
140. Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3091-92 (1989) (courts must ask
"whether 'the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents
of the controlling denomination as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval,
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School officials are permitted and expected to inculcate values,4"
as long as they act within the constraints of the establishment
clause.142 Indeed, the curriculum is a primary channel for the incul-
cation of desired values. 4 8 Thus, the curriculum materials that are
selected are regarded as reflective of the values that the school offi-
cials seek to inculcate.144 Likewise, the removal of a book from the
curriculum conveys disapproval of the book, or material in it, and
the simultaneous endorsement of a perspective that is directly con-
trary to a part of the book.
1 45
The public perception of school officials' actions is important in
book removal cases. When a court examines the second Lemon re-
quirement, the issue is not likely to be whether the removal conveys
a message of endorsement or disapproval of the book or material in
the book; disapproval of a part of the book is inherent in the act of
removal. Rather, the court must explore the public's perception of
the reason for the removal. If the public perceives the reason to be
religious, the court will conclude that the effect of the removal is the
impermissible endorsement of religion or religious perspectives.
1 46
of their individual religious choices' "); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
141. See supra notes 25-28, 51-54 and accompanying text; see also Board of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982) (Blackman, J., concurring) ("the school is designed to, and
inevitably will, inculcate ways of thought and outlooks"); Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (discussing role and purpose of public education as "'inculcat[ing the
habits and manners of civility' ") (citations omitted); Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 765
(1979) (discussing importance of public education for "preservation of the values on which our
society rests"); cf. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (discussing
school's role as including "'awakening the child to cultural values' ") (quoting Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
142. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing need to reconcile
the schools' inculcative function with the First Amendment restrictions); Stewart, supra note
26, at 86 ("the power of school authorities [to select curricula material] is not unbounded,
since the establishment clause places limits on what a majority may use its government to
accomplish").
143. Pico, 457 U.S. at 863 ("local school boards must be permitted 'to establish and
apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values' "); id. at 868 (Court,
assessing freedom of expression challenge, observes that school boards "might well defend
their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to
inculcate community values") (emphasis added).
144. Stewart, supra note 26, at 23, 26 ("to a large extent the state will and should be
perceived as giving its endorsement to materials presented through its educational programs");
id. at 88 ("state's interest in controlling its educational programs is ... based on the desire to
avoid giving the erroneous impression that the community has endorsed materials which in
fact it finds objectionable").
145. See Pratt v. Indiana School Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 776 n.6 (8th Cir. 1982) (court
finds effect of banning material from curriculum is to "indicate[] that the ideas contained in
the banned material are unacceptable"). Further, because the removal is likely to be the ex-
ception, rather than the rule, the message of disapproval sent by the removal will be stronger
than the endorsement message sent by the routine selection of books for use in the curricula.
146. This analysis focuses on public perception of motivation, in contrast to the first part
of the Lemon test, which focuses on actual motivation.
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Thus, if a book removal were perceived to flow from religious
aversion to the book, the school would be placing its stamp of ap-
proval on the religious perspective that found the book objectiona-
ble.14, 7 Those students whose religious tenets shared the objection
would perceive themselves as holding the preferred religious beliefs
and as having an ideological alliance with the public school system.
Conversely, the students who do not share these perceived precepts
would find themselves to be outsiders relative to the ideological com-
munity. Further, if books that were offensive to other religious
precepts were retained, those sharing these precepts would be disfa-
vored among members of the public school community.
VI. Conclusion
In the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Hazelwood,
courts confronted with public school book removal issues have ap-
plied first amendment standards that disregard establishment clause
mandates. Unlike freedom of expression, which under Hazelwood
may be compromised by educational interests in the public schools,
establishment clause mandates must be scrupulously applied in pub-
lic schools. Failure to apply scrupulously establishment clause man-
dates in the public school context erodes a vital source of constitu-
tional protection in the very arena in which it is most demanded.
The Lemon test, designed to illuminate establishment clause vi-
olations, requires courts to assess whether the challenged act was in-
tended to convey or has the effect of conveying a message of endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion. Courts are forced to make this
assessment in an environment in which officials, cognizant of estab-
lishment clause prohibitions, attempt to insulate their actions from
attack by creating "paper trails" that reflect pretextual secular justi-
fications rather than religious motives. Judicial intervention is criti-
cal to prevent this circumvention of establishment clause mandates.
The Supreme Court's recent focus on whether the message con-
veyed by the government action either endorses or disapproves of re-
ligion should, to some extent, shortcut courts' assessments of whether
book removals violate the establishment clause. The removal of a
book from a public school invariably carries with it a message of
disapproval of some part of the book. Therefore, courts only have to
147. Cf. Grove v. Mead School Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1539 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby, J.,
concurring) ("The issue is not whether The Learning Tree embodies anti-Christian elements
, * * the issue is whether its selection and retention by school officials 'communicat[es] a mes-
sage of government endorsement of those elements' ") (emphasis in original).
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assess whether the substance of the message conveys endorsement or
disapproval of religion.
The fact that book removals carry an inherent message of disap-
proval to the public school community further underscores the need
for courts to evaluate their establishment clause permissiveness. Re-
cent decisions erroneously focusing on the Hazelwood standard have
failed to meet this need.
